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bankruptcy.3 The consequences of an event of default vary by agreement; penalty payments or a
change in the payment priorities of the defaulting counterparty (“flip clause”) are common. A
flip clause is a provision which changes the party’s payment priority for the proceeds from the
liquidation of the collateral underlying the swap. Whether a flip clause is covered by the Safe
Harbor Provision is the subject of this memo.
There are three cases involving the Lehman Bros. bankruptcy that are of particular
importance to this issue. In the immediate fallout from the 2008 financial crisis, and the collapse
of the swap market, Judge Andrew J. Peck decided two cases related to the early termination of
swap agreements as a result of Lehman’s bankruptcy. Judge Peck found the penalty payments
were covered by the Safe Harbor Provision but the flip clauses were not because a change in
payment priority created different rights than those the defaulting party held before the
bankruptcy filing. Judge Peck retired in 2014 and in 2016 Judge Shelley C. Chapman decided
another case from the Lehman Bros bankruptcy. Judge Chapman applied a plain reading of the
Safe Harbor Provision to hold flip clauses were covered as a part of the “liquidation, termination,
or acceleration of the agreement.”
This memorandum addresses the issue of whether the safe harbor provisions set forth in the
Code cover flip clauses triggered by the early termination of a swap agreement. Part I addresses
Judge Peck’s narrow reading of the Safe Harbor Provision in the aftermath of the financial crisis.
Part II notes cases that addressed safe harbor provisions in between Judge Peck and Judge
Chapman’s rulings. Part III discusses Judge Chapman’s plain reading of the Safe Harbor
Provision. Part IV summarizes the case that dealt with another of the Code’s safe harbor
provisions.

3

11 U.S.C. § 560 (2012).

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY 11439

I.

JUDGE PECK’S NARROW READING OF THE SAFE HARBOR PROVISION
In Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. v. BoNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited,

Judge Andrew J. Peck, United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Southern District of New York,
held the swaps between Lehman and its counterparty were subject to the Anti-Ipso Facto
Provision and were not protected by the Safe Harbor Provision.4 He also described Lehman’s
operations as “perhaps the most complex and multi-faceted business ventures ever to seek the
protection of chapter 11” and the “largest business in bankruptcy history.”5 Judge Peck found the
contractual provisions that allowed the counterparty to terminate the agreement upon Lehman’s
bankruptcy were not actually a part of the swap agreement itself, nor were they incorporated by
reference, and therefore not covered by the Safe Harbor Provision. Additionally, he found that a
provision that changes a party’s payment priority (“flip clause”) was not included in the
“liquidation, termination or acceleration” of swaps covered by that section.6
Judge Peck noted the Code’s Anti-Ipso Facto provisions had never been construed under
comparable circumstances. He also noted that was likely to make his ruling “a controversial one”
because excluding flip clauses was a narrow reading of the Safe Harbor Provision.7
In Lehman Bros. Special Financing Inc. v. Ballyrock ABS CDO 2007-1 Ltd.
(“Ballyrock”), 452 B.R. 31 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010), Judge Peck held the flip clause in swaps
between Lehman and its counterparty was subject to the Anti-Ipso Facto provision and was not
protected by the Safe Harbor Provision.8 If Lehman was the defaulting party, the provision
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caused Lehman’s payment priority to drop from as high as third to as low as nineteenth.9 Judge
Peck relied on the “policy considerations” he discussed in BoNY to hold an “Event of Default
may not be used to reallocate financial outcomes to the detriment” of a counterparty.10 There
were no penalty payments at issue in this case.
Judge Peck noted courts have not interpreted the words “liquidation, termination, or
acceleration” in the Safe Harbor Provision beyond their plain meaning.11
In these two cases, Judge Peck applied a narrow reading to find flip clauses were not
covered by the Safe Harbor Provision. Judge Peck distinguished between the “liquidation,
termination, or acceleration” language in the Safe Harbor Provision and a flip clause. Judge Peck
found a flip clause went beyond the “liquidation, termination, or acceleration” of a swap because
it altered the rights of the defaulting party if that party was “in-the-money” by significantly
lowering the party’s payment priority. The protection provided by the Safe Harbor Provision is
limited to the non-defaulting party’s ability to terminate the swap as is. According to Judge
Peck’s ruling, any contractual clause that alters a party’s rights, rather than simply terminates,
accelerates, or liquidates, a swap is outside the scope of the Safe Harbor Provision.
As noted in some of the opinions in the following section, and Judge Peck himself, the
ruling was controversial and created doubt as to the early termination of swap agreements as a
result of a counterparty’s bankruptcy.
II.

INTERMEDIATE OPINIONS ADDRESSING CODE’S SAFE HARBOR PROVISIONS
In In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Judge Colleen McMahon, United States District Court

Judge for the Southern District of New York, granted BoNY’s motion for leave to appeal Judge
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Peck’s decision in the BoNY case.12 Judge McMahon quoted Judge Peck’s language from that
opinion in which Judge Peck described his decision as “breaking new ground.”13 Judge
McMahon noted that the holding from BoNY left substantial ground for a difference of opinion.14
He also points out the majority of the commentary available at the time of the BoNY decision
was critical. Lehman “meekly” cited a single article noting the response had been “mixed.”15
Additionally, the ruling from BoNY “triggered significant uncertainty in the financial
community” with billions of dollars in the balance.16 Judge McMahon noted that Judge Peck was
faced with an extremely difficult question of first impression that required review from the
district court.17 However, the parties settled before the appeal was actually heard.
In Swedbank AB v. Lehman Bros. Holding Inc. (“Swedbank”), Judge Naomi Reice
Buchwald, United States District Court Judge for the Southern District of New York, affirmed
Judge Peck’s holding which declined to apply the Safe Harbor Provision to an attempted setoff
because the funds at issue were not related to the swap.18 Judge Buchwald discussed the
legislative history behind the Safe Harbor Provision to support the holding. In passing the Safe
Harbor Provision, Congress intended to allow counterparties to free themselves from the
obligations specific to the swap and not from “the general commercial obligations of parties to
swap agreements.”19 This opinion did not discuss the Anti-Ipso Facto Provision. The setoff at
issue was not automatically triggered by a bankruptcy filing but an attempt by a counterparty to

12

In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555 (JMP), 2010 WL 10078354 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
23, 2010).
13
Id. at *1.
14
Id. at *6.
15
Id. at *7.
16
Id. at *9.
17
Id. at *7.
18
Swedbank AB v. Lehman Bros. Holding Inc. (“Swedbank”), 445 B.R. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
19
Id. at 135.
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY 11439

use post-petition assets unrelated to a swap agreement.20 Judge Buchwald also noted the need for
the non-defaulting counterparty to be able to terminate the swap quickly in the interest of market
stability.21
In Michigan State Housing Development Authority v. Lehman Bros. Derivative Products
Inc. (“MSHDA”), Judge Peck held that a clause in a swap causing a reduction in the size of the
termination payment based on a counterparty filing for bankruptcy was subject to the Anti-Ipso
Facto Provision but was protected by the Safe Harbor Provision.22 The issue in MSHDA was
whether the right to liquidate a swap under the safe harbor provision was separate from the actual
method of liquidation, as Lehman argued.23 Lehman asserted the right to liquidate the swaps may
be covered by the safe harbor provision, but the method of liquidation was not because it
significantly lowered the payment Lehman was entitled to upon termination.24 Judge Peck noted
“[t]here is a significant difference between the reordering of priorities within a hierarchy of
distributions” and “selecting which method to use when disposing and valuing collateral in
connection with liquidating a terminated swap agreement.”25
In In re MPM Silicones, No. 14-22503-rdd, 2014 WL 4436335 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 9, 2014), Judge Robert D. Drain, United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Southern District
of New York, held lien trustees could not decelerate loans that had been automatically
accelerated by a bankruptcy filing.26 The agreements in that case did not implicate the Anti-Ipso
Facto Provision or the Safe Harbor Provision because the right at issue did not arise
20
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automatically from the filing of a bankruptcy nor was it a swap.27 At issue was a securities
contract; securities contracts have a safe harbor provision analogous to the Safe Harbor
Provision.28 However, Judge Drain cited to BoNY and Ballyrock to support the assertion that the
Code’s safe harbor provisions are “narrow provision[s] that should not be used to improve a
contract party’s standing or claim in the bankruptcy case.”29 Judge Drain also noted that the
deceleration in this case was not the exercise of an existing contractual right, but an attempt by
the lien trustees to create a new claim after a bankruptcy filing.30
In Chohan v. Chohan (In re Chohan), Judge Stephen V. Wilson, United States
District Court Judge for the Central District of California affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s
decision holding that the assignee of a counterparty’s interest in a terminated swap was not a
swap participant.31 Judge Wilson discussed the legislative history of the Safe Harbor Provision in
seeking to define swap participant.32 He pointed out that history reflected a concern for market
stability and a concern the non-defaulting party would be trapped in a swap agreement as interest
rates moved in the defaulting party’s favor.33 This case did not involve credit default swaps but
rather a swap agreement where one counterparty made fixed interest rate payments and the other
counterparty made payments per a floating interest rate.34
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Judge Wilson noted that once the swap has been terminated and the payments calculated,
there is no longer a need to protect the non-defaulting party from market volatility.35
The response to Judge Peck’s ruling in BoNY and Ballyrock was mostly negative as noted
by Judge McMahon in granting BoNY’s appeal from that ruling. Judge McMahon noted that
Judge Peck was in a difficult situation given the turmoil in the financial markets generally.
However, Judge McMahon also noted that the ruling “triggered significant uncertainty in the
financial community.” While the case was settled prior to the district court hearing the appeal,
Judge McMahon’s language suggests Judge Peck’s holdings in BoNY and Ballyrock would not
have would have been scrutinized closely by the district court.
Judge Buchwald’s ruling in Swedbank affirmed another one of Judge Peck’s holdings but
that case did not involve the termination or liquidation of swaps. The issue in that case involved
setoffs and did not implicate the Anti-Ipso Facto clause or the Safe Harbor Provision. The
opinion is relevant because Judge Buchwald discusses the need for non-defaulting counterparties
to terminate swaps quickly in the interest of market stability.
In MSHDA, Judge Peck detailed the difference between a penalty payment triggered by a
counterparty’s bankruptcy and a shift in a counterparty’s payment priority for the same reason.
In that case, Lehman attempted to bifurcate the liquidation process by claiming the right to
liquidate swaps was covered by the Safe Harbor Provision, but the actual process of liquidating
the swap was not. Judge Peck rejected this reasoning but noted the distinction between changing
a party’s payment priority and the particular method of liquidation the parties agreed to. The crux
of Judge Peck’s reasoning is that a change in payment priority creates new rights for the parties

35
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upon the filing of a bankruptcy which is forbidden. A payment penalty, in contrast, does not
change any rights of any parties.
The MPM Silicones case deals with the deceleration of loans as a result of a bankruptcy.
It is relevant because Judge Drain cites to both BoNY and Ballyrock to support the assertion that
the Code’s safe harbor provisions are narrow and are not meant to change the rights of involved
parties. Judge Drain makes a distinction between existing contractual rights and those created
upon a counterparty filing for bankruptcy.
The Chohan case turned on the definition of swap participant and whether assignees were
included in that definition. However, it is relevant because of Judge Wilson’s comments on
market stability. Judge Wilson noted the need to protect counterparties and promote market
stability dissipates after the swap is terminated and the payment is determined. Judge Wilson’s
emphasis on market stability is a theme that is used frequently in cases related to the Code’s safe
harbor provisions.
Whether a broad or narrow reading of the Code’s safe harbor provisions, including the
applicability of the safe harbors, best supports market stability remains an open question.
III.

JUDGE CHAPMAN’S PLAIN READING OF THE SAFE HARBOR PROVISION
In Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. v. Bank of America National Assoc. (“BoA”), Judge

Shelley C. Chapman, United States Bankruptcy Judge for Southern District of New York, found
contrary to Judge Peck’s holdings from BoNY and Ballyrock.36 Judge Chapman held that an ipso
facto provision that modified the defaulting party’s payment priority if it filed for bankruptcy
was covered by the Safe Harbor Provision.37 She found the Safe Harbor Provision required a

36

Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. v. Bank of America National Assoc. (“BoA”), 553 B.R. 476
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broad interpretation “to promote the stability and efficiency of the financial markets.”38 Judge
Chapman found the text of the Safe Harbor Provision was “unambiguously sweeping” and “plain
and controlling on its face.” and must be read that way to preserve Congress’ intent.39
Judge Chapman noted that Judge Peck made his rulings on BoNY and Ballyrock during a
difficult time but “perspectives on difficult legal questions [need to] develop and evolve over
time.”40
Judge Chapman’s ruling in BoA effectively overturned Judge Peck’s earlier rulings from
the Lehman cases. Judge Chapman noted that Judge Peck was making his decisions during a
very difficult time but that perspectives needed to evolve over time as conditions change. In
contrast to Judge Peck’s narrow ruling of the Safe Harbor Provision, as noted above, Judge
Chapman found the language in the Safe Harbor Provision was “unambiguously sweeping” and
only that type of reading would serve Congress’ intent in protecting the markets.
In the absence of subsequent rulings on point, it remains an open question whether Judge
Chapman’s ruling represents a sort of return to normalcy after the dust from the financial crisis
settled or whether Judge Peck’s rulings hold up in different circumstances.
IV.

ONE CASE THAT HAS CITED TO JUDGE CHAPMAN’S DECISION FROM BOA
In In re Louisiana Pellets, No. 16-80162, 2016 WL 4011318 (Bankr. W.D. La.

July 22, 2016), Judge Robert Summerhays, United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Western
District of Louisiana, held a forward commodities contract which termination was conditioned
on contract performance was not covered by one of the Code’s safe harbor provisions.41 Similar
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to the Safe Harbor Provision, the safe harbor at issue in this case protects transactions covered by
the Anti-Ipso Facto Provision.42 The language in section 365(e)(1) limits its application to the
three specific instances listed and does not include a party’s failure to perform under a contract.43
Judge Summerhays noted that, consistent with Judge Chapman’s holding in BoA, the
Code’s safe harbor provisions are generally read broadly and according to their plain terms to
promote their underlying purpose.44
Judge Summerhays’ reading of the Code’s safe harbor provisions is consistent with Judge
Chapman’s ruling from BoA. However, this case offers little guidance because it discusses the
Code’s safe harbor provisions generally and not the provision specific to the anti-ipso facto
clause. It is notable that Judge Summerhays discussed the need for a broad reading to affect the
underlying purpose of the provisions.
CONCLUSION
The Code’s safe harbor provisions are applicable to penalty payments tied to the early
termination of credit default swap agreements but whether the provisions are applicable to flip
clauses remains uncertain because there has been no decision on point since Judge Chapman’s
holding in BoA.

42
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